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ABSTRACT 
  American taxpayers spend more than $100 billion per year on 
federal construction projects. Yet massive construction delays, huge 
budget overruns, and unorganized contractors increase the cost of 
construction for the federal government. Passed in 1935, the Miller Act 
attempted to protect the federal government in the event that the 
contractor defaulted or was unable to complete the project. By 
requiring contractors to enlist third party “sureties” as guarantors on 
projects, the Miller Act provides the government with the assurance that 
another party will step in to complete projects if need be. Contractors 
are typically paid via periodic progress payments, with monthly 
invoices paid for work completed. If a contractor defaults, forcing a 
surety to take over on the project, the doctrine of equitable subrogation 
entitles the surety to all remaining progress payments due to the 
contractor. Fearing that default may be imminent and eager to receive 
any payments it can, a surety may be inclined to warn the federal 
government of imminent contractor default, at the same time that the 
contractor assures the federal government that it can perform. A series 
of Federal Circuit cases allows the surety to sue the federal government 
to recover progress payments that were already made to the contractor, 
even though those payments were made prior to the contractor 
defaulting, in accordance with federal regulations. 
  Given an opportunity to reduce this risk of double payment, the 
Federal Circuit instead created an incoherent and unworkable 
progress-payment framework in Balboa Insurance Co. v. United 
States, complicating a government official’s regulatory mandate to 
provide progress payments to contractors. The court misinterpreted a 
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standard that is normally extremely deferential to the federal 
government, and created a complex eight-factor behemoth that 
unreasonably burdens the federal government. This Note proposes new 
regulations to replace Balboa, which focuses on whether the federal 
government received reasonable assurances from the contractor that it 
would complete performance. 
INTRODUCTION 
In an era of contentious budget cuts,1 appropriations for many 
federal programs have been slashed.2 Yet for federal construction 
contractors, business is booming. Last year, American taxpayers spent 
more than $123 billion on federal construction projects.3 Recent 
projects include massive undertakings such as building a permanent 
home for the Department of Homeland Security costing a total of $4.5 
billion,4 expanding Washington D.C.’s public transportation system 
with $975 million in federal funds,5 and constructing a new nuclear 
waste facility with a $7.7 billion price tag.6 
To minimize delays and cost overruns that can plague construction 
projects, the federal government has enacted statutes and promulgated 
regulations that help protect the government during complex and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, House Republicans Propose Budget with Deep Cuts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/us/politics/house-republican-budget-
overhauls-medicare-and-repeals-the-health-law.html [https://perma.cc/9CDT-P4KN] (describing 
Democrats’ negative reaction to a recent Republican budget proposal that would reduce spending 
by $5.5 trillion over 10 years).  
 2. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT, 87–88 (2005) (listing $3.358 billion in discretionary cuts and $69.491 billion in 
mandatory cuts in the fiscal year 2016 budget).  
 3. See AGC Summary of Federal Construction Accounts ($ in Millions) FY 2017 Budget, 
ASSOCIATED GEN. CONTRACTORS OF AM., https://www.agc.org/sites/default/files/Federal%20 
Construction%20Accounts_FY%2017_budgetfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4KC-LURC] (listing 
fiscal year 2016 appropriations for construction accounts at $123.929 billion). 
 4. Oversight of the DHS Headquarters Project at St. Elizabeths: Impact on the Taxpayer 
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency of the H. Comm. on Homeland 
Security, 113th Cong. 26 (2014) (statement of Norman Dong, Chairman, Public Building Service, 
General Services Administration). 
 5. Press Release, Wash. Metro Transp. Auth., Metro Launches Silver Line, Largest 
Expansion of Region’s Rail System in More than Two Decades (July 25, 2015), 
http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/news/PressReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=5749 
[https://perma.cc/M5NK-JJ5J]. 
 6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-14-231, PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION PROGRAM: 
DOE NEEDS TO ANALYZE THE ROOT CAUSES OF COST INCREASES AND DEVELOP BETTER 
COST ESTIMATES 28 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660927.pdf [https://perma.cc/X347-
ELPJ]. 
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costly projects. Among them, the Miller Act,7 enacted in 1935, relies on 
an ancient commercial technique8 to mitigate the risk of a contractor 
failing to perform.9 It requires any contractor undertaking a federal 
project to secure bonds from a “surety” to guarantee performance.10 A 
surety is a third-party insurer who agrees to take responsibility for the 
contractor’s contractual obligations if the contractor fails to perform.11 
A bond is a contractual agreement between the contractor and the 
surety; thus, the federal government does not contract directly with the 
surety.12 The surety charges the contractor a fee, called a “premium,” 
for its bond services, adjusted for the surety’s risk assessment of the 
project.13 These bonds protect the federal government by requiring the 
surety to complete performance if the prime contractor defaults.14 A 
prime contractor “defaults” when it materially breaches the contract 
by, for example, falling far behind schedule or going out of business 
entirely.15 When the project goes awry, the surety must step in and 
finish performance by finding a new contractor. 
In addition to requiring a contractor to secure surety bonds on a 
project, the federal government also protects itself by paying for 
construction work in installments, rather than in a lump sum. These 
periodic payments, called progress payments, provide the contractor 
 
 7. Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131–3133 (2012). 
 8. See HAMMURABI, THE COMPLETE CODE OF HAMMURABI § 23 (H.-Dieter Viel trans., 
LINCOM Europa ed. 2005) (c. 1772 B.C.E.) (“If a criminal has not been caught, the injured man 
shall declare in the presence of god what he has lost and the citizens of the state or the leader of 
the province where the crime was committed shall repay to him anything he has lost.”).  
 9. See 40 U.S.C. § 3131(b)(1) (requiring contractors to secure a performance bond “for the 
protection of the Government”). 
 10. Id. § 3131(b)(1)–(2) (requiring contractors to secure both payment and performance 
bonds). 
 11. See Anthony N. Palladino & Anna P. Clarke, The Recognition of Sureties’ Rights Under 
Government Contracts, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 637, 645 (1990) (noting that the performance bond 
“ensur[es] that [the government] will receive a completed project at the price set forth in the 
underlying contract”). 
 12. See Shwarz v. United States, 35 Ct. Cl. 303, 309 (1900) (noting that there is a “want of 
privity” between the surety and the United States); Palladino & Clarke, supra note 11, at 637 
(describing the “lack of privity” between sureties and the federal government).  
 13. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SEC. § 82 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1941) (describing a 
“compensated surety” as a surety that receives a premium based on a “computation of risks on 
an actuarial basis”).  
 14. See James F. Nagle & Johnathan A. DeMella, A Primer on Prime Contractor-
Subcontractor Disputes Under Federal Contracts, PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 2011, at 12, 15 
(“[A] performance bond is issued to protect the government . . . .”). 
 15. Richard S. Wisner & James A. Knox, Jr., The ABCs of Contractors’ Surety Bonds, 82 ILL. 
B.J. 244, 246 (1994). 
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with enough capital to continue working on the project, while 
incentivizing the contractor to remain on schedule.16 The Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) require a government contracting 
officer to make prompt progress payments after receiving a 
contractor’s invoice for work completed.17 For instance, when the 
prime contractor properly submits a monthly invoice for pouring 
concrete, wiring a building for electricity, and installing plumbing, the 
government official must certify a payment within fourteen days for the 
work completed.18 If the government official chooses to withhold a 
progress payment from a contractor, the agency might be violating the 
FAR and might also have materially breached the contract.19 
When prime contractors encounter problems on the jobsite, there 
can be significant payment complications. If the contractor defaults 
and the surety is required to step in and complete the project, the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation allows the surety to “stand[] in the 
shoes” of the contractor20 and receive all future progress payments.21 
But even before a contractor defaults, a surety can claim that default is 
imminent and demand that the government send the progress payment 
to the surety, rather than the contractor. In that scenario, a low-level 
government official22 is placed in the precarious position of assessing 
whether the contractor is capable of finishing the project. If the 
government official determines that default is not imminent, he or she 
 
 16. T. Scott Leo, The Financing Surety and the Chapter 11 Principal, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 45, 
56 n.38 (1990) (noting that progress payments provide contractors with the “working capital” to 
fund overhead costs).  
 17. FAR 32.904 (2013) (“The due date for making progress payments based on contracting 
officer approval of the estimated amount and value of work or services performed, including 
payments for reaching milestones in any project, is 14 days after the designated billing office 
receives a proper payment request.”). 
 18. See id. (establishing the fourteen-day deadline).  
 19. See Johnson v. All-State Constr., Inc. 329 F.3d 848, 851 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that the 
issue was whether the Navy’s withholding of a percent of the earned progress payments operated 
“as a breach of contract”); C.S. Maravilla & David Schneider, The Government’s Non-Bankruptcy 
Rights for Debt Collection, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 267, 274–75 (2013) (describing several cases in which 
the government official’s decision to withhold progress payments was deemed a material breach). 
 20. Joseph C. Kovars & Jay Bernstein, When the Shoes Don’t Fit: Defenses of the Principal 
that Are Unavailable to the Surety, 29 CONSTRUCTION L. 24, 24 (2009). 
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUAR. § 27(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1996) 
(“Upon total satisfaction of the underlying obligation, the secondary obligor is subrogated to all 
rights of the obligee with respect to the underlying obligation to the extent that performance of 
the secondary obligation contributed to the satisfaction.”). 
 22. See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 
1567 (1992) (noting that contracting officers with the power to terminate a contract may be at a 
“low level”).  
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will likely abide by the FAR and continue to make progress payments 
to the contractor per the terms of the contract. But if the contractor 
subsequently defaults, the government is vulnerable to a lawsuit from 
the surety to recover the contested progress payment that was already 
sent to the contractor. This equitable basis for recovery, recognized by 
the Court of Federal Claims,23 adds insult to injury by potentially 
forcing the federal government to pay twice for work performed, 
without the possibility of the government being made whole by the 
defaulted contractor. 
In Balboa Insurance Co. v. United States,24 the Federal Circuit 
outlined a complicated framework to assess whether a government 
official appropriately exercised his or her discretion in disbursing a 
progress payment to the contractor. The framework has become 
entrenched in construction law over the last thirty years. Supposedly 
embodying the extremely deferential “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an 
abuse of discretion” standard from the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),25 the court relied on a jumbled array of Court of Federal 
Claims cases to synthesize an eight-factor behemoth.26 If the court 
applies this test and concludes that the government official did not 
exercise reasonable discretion when it paid the contractor, the 
 
 23. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 676 F.2d 622, 629 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Royal 
Indem. Co. v. United States, 529 F.2d 1312, 1321 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. United States, 
434 F.2d 1362, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1970).  
 24. Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 25. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1164 (stating that the factors are 
“important in determining whether the Government has exercised reasonable discretion in 
distributing funds”)  
 26. Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1164–65. The eight Balboa factors are as follows:  
(1) Attempts by the federal government after notification by the surety, to determine 
that the contractor had the capacity and intent to complete the job. 
(2) Percentage of contract performance completed at the time of notification by the 
surety.  
(3) Efforts of the [Federal] Government to determine the progress made on the 
contract after notice by the surety. 
(4) Whether the contract was subsequently completed by the contractor . . . . 
(5) Whether the payments to the contractor subsequently reached the subcontractors 
and [suppliers] . . . . 
(6) Whether the [federal] agency had notice of problems with the contractor’s 
performance before the surety’s notification of default . . . . 
(7) Whether the [Federal] Government’s action violates one of its own statutes or 
regulations. 
(8) Evidence that the contract could or could not be completed as quickly or cheaply 
by a successor contractor.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
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government must pay the surety the disputed progress payment that 
was already sent to the contractor in good faith.27 
While “reasonable discretion” is seemingly very deferential to the 
government officer, the long-entrenched Balboa framework is 
fundamentally flawed, and those flaws come at the government’s 
expense. Balboa’s progress-payment framework is irrational and 
unworkable, and it undermines the purpose of the Miller Act requiring 
sureties. Several Balboa factors are at odds with the federal regulations 
covering government-funded construction, and the court did not 
provide a mechanism for weighing one factor against any other. The 
Balboa framework is also troubling because of the informational 
disparity between the surety and the government official: the surety is 
in the better position to assess the contractor’s risk of default and price 
that risk into the bond premium, yet the framework inefficiently places 
the onus for assessing that risk on the government official. Moreover, 
the Balboa factors are costly to litigate, leading the federal government 
to settle lawsuits that may lack merit. Ironically, this complex 
framework—which emerged from legislation designed to protect the 
federal government—may force the federal government to pay twice 
for work.28 
While frequent delays and cost overruns have led many to criticize 
the federal acquisition program,29 this troublesome Federal Circuit 
case law has presented a structural impediment to righting the ship. 
Until corrected, the progress-payment framework puts government 
officials in a catch-22 situation that will continue to exacerbate delays 
and cost overruns on federal projects. 
This Note argues that the eight Balboa factors ought to be 
replaced. Prior to the surety notifying the government of the 
contractor’s risk of default, the government official should have 
 
 27. Id. at 1160 (“Balboa asserted that it should have received the fifth payment check and, 
when the Government denied liability, sought recovery of that amount in the U.S. Claims 
Court.”); see also United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 555, 558–61 (1989) (applying 
the Balboa factors to progress payment litigation); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 
590, 594–96 (1987) (applying the Balboa factors to progress payment litigation).  
 28. Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1158 (noting that the surety sought to recover progress payments that 
were already paid to the prime contractor).  
 29. See Shelley Roberts Econom, Confronting the Looming Crisis in the Federal Acquisition 
Workforce, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 171, 185 (2006) (noting that Department of Defense contracting 
guidelines can create schedule delays and increased costs); Bob Davis, Feds’ Procurement 
Shortcomings a Threat to Industry, FCW (Jan. 5, 2015), https://fcw.com/articles/2015/01/05/
federal-procurement-shortcomings.aspx [https://perma.cc/QB59-SKS2] (noting that the lack of 
government procurement officers contributes to delays on projects).  
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unlimited discretion to make progress payments for work completed, 
absent a showing of fraud. If the surety notifies the government that 
default is imminent, the government official should be required to 
exercise due diligence and seek out reasonable assurances that the 
contractor can complete performance. The precise contours of the due-
diligence standard should be defined through FAR administrative 
rulemaking, rather than the irrational and unworkable framework 
created by the Federal Circuit in Balboa. 
Part I provides background information on sureties and the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation in Miller Act construction projects. 
Part II analyzes the Balboa factors, highlighting their irrational 
features and the problems with their application. Part III recommends 
that Balboa’s framework be eliminated in favor of FAR rulemaking 
that would simply require a government official to receive assurances 
from the contractor when the surety warns of potential default. This 
Note then briefly concludes. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. History of Sureties 
The modern construction surety industry earns profits of more 
than $1 billion annually,30 yet surety agreements began as an ancient 
and simple means of guaranteeing contractual performance. The first 
surviving record of a surety agreement dates from 2750 B.C.E., when a 
Mesopotamian tablet chronicled the plight of a farmer drafted into the 
king’s army.31 Unable to tend to his fields while serving in the army, the 
man enlisted the aid of another farmer to cultivate his land in his 
absence, in exchange for splitting the profits.32 A local merchant served 
as the agreement’s surety by guaranteeing that the second farmer 
would take care of the land.33 Surety agreements were codified by law 
in Hammurabi’s Code in a peculiar passage protecting citizens from 
robbery.34 Section 23 of the Code required the state to indemnify a 
 
 30. AON RISK SOLUTIONS, SURETY MARKET 2014 OUTLOOK 1 (2014), http://www.aon.com/ 
attachments/risk-services/2014-Surety-Market-Update-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PJ9-6ML4]. 
 31. JEFFREY S. RUSSELL, SURETY BONDS FOR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 9 (2000). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. See supra note 8.  
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robbery victim if the thief was never captured.35 In effect, the state 
served as the surety of the escaped robber by guaranteeing payment to 
the victim. In the ancient world, surety agreements were usually based 
on familial or community relationships,36 as discussed in the Bible and 
Apocrypha37 and embraced by the Roman Empire.38  
By the time of the Magna Carta, sureties were recognized as an 
important tool for facilitating commercial ventures without a banking 
industry.39 The importation of English common-law principles made 
lawsuits involving surety relationships common in the early United 
States.40 In 1865, the Fidelity Insurance Company became the first 
surety company in the United States,41 which signaled the replacement 
of “personal, uncompensated” sureties with corporate firms.42 
Less than three decades after the first American surety company 
was formed, Congress passed the Heard Act,43 which required any 
person who contracted for the construction of a public building or 
public work to secure a bond from a surety company, guaranteeing that 
the laborers and subcontractors would be paid in the event of 
 
 35. Id.; see FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS 3 (Duncan L. Clore ed., 2d ed. 1998) (noting 
that in effect, “the city and governor served as the surety for the ‘infidelity’ of the robber who got 
away”).  
 36. David C. Olson, Magna Carta Viewed as Embodiment of Commerce, TORTSOURCE, 
Winter 2015, at 1, 6 (2015) (contrasting the modern commercial form of suretyship with ancient 
sureties based on familial relationships).  
 37. According to the Apocrypha, 
An honest man is surety for his neighbour; but he that is impudent will forsake him. 
Forget not the friendship of thy surety, for he hath given his life for thee. A sinner will 
overthrow the good estate of his surety: And he that is of an unthankful mind will leave 
him that delivered him. Suretiship [sic] hath undone many of good estate, and shaken 
them as a wave of the sea: and he that undertaketh and followeth other men’s business 
for gain shall fall into suits. 
Ecclesiasticus 29:14–19 (King James); see also Hebrews 7:22 (King James) (“By so much was Jesus 
made a surety of a better testament.”). 
 38. See Wisner & Knox, supra note 15, at 244 (“A requirement for a Roman gateway project 
in 106 B.C. was that ‘whoever shall be awarded the contract shall furnish bondsmen secured by 
real estate to the satisfaction of the magistrates.’” (quoting J. Harry Cross, Suretyship Is Not 
Insurance, 30 INS. COUNS. J. 235, 235 (1963))).  
 39. Olson, supra note 36, at 6. 
 40. Id. (citing Ford v. Keith, 1 Mass. 139 (1804); Vance v. Lancaster, 4 Tenn. 130 (1816)).   
 41. Willis D. Morgan, The History and Economics of Suretyship, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 487, 487 
(1927) (noting that Fidelity Insurance Company was the first surety company to operate in North 
America).  
 42. Olson, supra note 36, at 6.  
 43. Heard Act of 1894, ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278, repealed by Miller Act, ch. 642, 49 Stat. 793, 794 
(1935) (current version at 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131–3133 (2012)). 
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contractor default.44 The Miller Act replaced the Heard Act in 1935 
and created the modern construction surety framework.45  
B. Sureties’ Purpose and Function 
Although sureties exist in different forms,46 the central tenet of 
surety agreements is consistent throughout: the surety has a 
contractual obligation to satisfy the debtor’s promise if the debtor 
defaults.47 A surety agreement contemplates three parties: the 
principal (debtor), the surety, and the obligee. The principal is the 
person who owes the obligation, the surety provides the guarantee, and 
the obligee owns the obligation.48 The obligee is not a contractual party 
to the surety agreement, however.49 The obligee is merely the 
beneficiary of the agreement, while the surety agreement binds the 
principal and the surety.50 
The guarantee that the surety furnishes is called a bond.51 
Generally, a surety receives some sort of payment from the principal 
in exchange for agreeing to satisfy the principal’s obligation to the 
obligee.52 A surety typically uses a percentage of the project’s total 
price as a guideline for setting the premium amount, but also considers 
a risk assessment of the contractor’s ability to complete the project.53  
 
 44. Jack E. Kerrigan & David C. Harris, The Preemption Debate: What Is the Scope of the 
Miller Act Remedial Scheme?, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1998, at 1, 2 (comparing the bond that protected 
suppliers to a state’s mechanics’ lien).  
 45. See infra Part I.C. 
 46. Suzanne Wilhelm, Taking Suretyship Seriously, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 87, 88 (1993) 
(listing the uses of sureties, ranging from securing a corporation’s commercial loan to securing a 
spouse’s line of credit).  
 47. See id. at 88–89 (“But regardless of the form of the underlying business relationship 
between the creditor and debtor, and regardless of the form that the suretyship takes, it is the 
surety’s obligation to satisfy the debtor’s promise in the event of the debtor’s default.”).  
 48. Philip G. Alber, Making Sense out of Performance and Payment Bonds, 71 MICH. B.J. 
1020, 1020 (1992).  
 49. Randall S. Udelman, Comment, Surety Contractors: Are Sureties Becoming General 
Liability Insurers?, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 469, 484 (1990) (noting that only the principal and the obligee 
are parties to the underlying construction project).  
 50. Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1978); Udelman, 
supra note 49, at 470 n.8 (citing United States v. Tilleraas, 709 F.2d 1088, 1091 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
 51. Id. at 469. 
 52. Alber, supra note 48, at 1020.  
 53. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SEC. § 82 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1941) (defining a 
“compensated surety” as a surety that receives a premium based on a “computation of risks on 
an actuarial basis”); The Consumer’s Total Guide to Surety Bonds, SURETYBONDS.COM, 
https://www.suretybonds.com/edu/guide.html [https://perma.cc/WE2M-CVY5] (“The bond type 
- including its amount, term and contractual risk - determines the complexity of the underwriting 
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If the principal fails to perform its obligation, the obligee can call 
on the surety to step in and perform, per the terms of the bond.54 In the 
context of federal construction projects, the contractor is the principal 
and the federal government is the obligee. If the contractor stops 
paying its subcontractors or abandons the jobsite, the federal 
government can require the surety to carry out an action, per the terms 
of the bond.55 
The action the surety must take is based on the guarantee made in 
the bond. Sureties offer two types of bonds, one that primarily protects 
the investments of the project’s subcontractors and suppliers, and 
another that protects the federal government’s interest in the project’s 
timely completion. The first type of bond, called a “payment bond,” is 
triggered when the contractor is unable to pay its subcontractors and 
laborers on a project.56 The surety steps in to pay the contractor’s bills, 
“protecti[ng] . . . all persons supplying labor and material in carrying 
out the work provided for in the contract.”57 In contrast, a 
“performance bond” protects the federal government if the prime 
contractor defaults.58 A prime contractor defaults when it materially 
breaches the terms of the construction contract.59 Examples of 
contractor default include falling significantly behind schedule on a 
time-sensitive project and walking off the site because the contractor 
could not afford to pay its subcontractors.  
If the contractor defaults, the performance bond “ensur[es] that 
the [g]overnment will receive a completed project at the price set forth 
in the underlying contract.”60 If the performance bond is triggered, the 
surety is responsible for finding a new contractor and ensuring that the 
project is completed at no additional cost to the government. 
 
process. The applicant’s credentials - including credit scores, past work history, references and 
professional reputation - indicates a principal’s financial credibility.”).  
 54. SURETYBONDS.COM, supra note 53 (“[Surety bonds] guarantee that people do their 
jobs . . . . If the principal fails to fulfill the bond’s obligations . . . . the surety will provide 
compensation up to the bond amount.”). 
 55. See Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. United States, 118 F.3d 1542, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that 
the contractor abandoned the jobsite so the surety completed construction “in accordance with 
its performance bond”).  
 56. Nagle & DeMella, supra note 14, at 15 (noting that payment bonds protect a 
subcontractor if it was not paid by the contractor).  
 57. 40 U.S.C. § 3131(b)(2) (2012). 
 58. Nagle & DeMella, supra note 14, at 15.  
 59. Wisner & Knox, supra note 15, at 246.  
 60. Palladino & Clarke, supra note 11, at 645. 
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Sureties are critical to the success of federal construction projects. 
Contractor default is rampant, with tens of thousands of construction 
firms going out of business annually.61 Construction projects tend to be 
large in scale and take place over many months or years, increasing the 
risk of problems along the way.62 Without performance bonds, the 
government could face significant expense and hardship as it scrambled 
to find a new contractor after the original contractor defaulted.63 The 
federal government would need to assess the work remaining on the 
project, open a bidding process to select a new contractor, and 
negotiate terms with the replacement contractor.64 
Moreover, without sureties, the federal government would 
struggle to meet its statutory obligations under the Small Business Act 
of 1953,65 which requires agencies to award a “fair proportion” of all 
government contracts—including those for construction projects—to 
small businesses.66 Without the protection of a surety, the federal 
government would be less inclined to hire small-business contractors 
for fear that smaller firms would be more likely to go out of business, 
obligating the government to develop a contingency plan for an 
incomplete project. Performance bonds provide the federal 
government with the security that critical construction projects will be 
completed according to schedule, regardless of the size of the 
contractor. 
While the surety must step in and complete the project under a 
performance bond if the contractor defaults, it does not surrender all 
 
 61. SURETY INFO. OFFICE, WHY DO CONTRACTORS FAIL? (2014), 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.surety.org/resource/resmgr/LearnAboutSurety/Why_Do_Contrac
tors_Fail.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4ND-744X] (citing a 2014 BizMiner study that found that of the 
986,057 contractors in business in 2011, only 735,160 were still in business two years later).  
 62. T. Scott Leo, The Construction Contract Surety and Some Suretyship Defenses, 34 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1225, 1226, 1228 (1993) (noting that even simple construction projects require 
financing expertise, entail significant transactional costs, and are “risky” ventures).   
 63. Id. at 1226 (noting that if a contractor defaults, there could be “substantial” transaction 
costs, including finding a replacement contractor, assessing the remaining work, and negotiating 
the contract for completing the project).  
 64. Id.  
 65. Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232 (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 631–657 (2012)); see also FAR 19.202-1 (2015) (describing the accommodations that a 
contracting officer should make to “encourage” small-business participation in federal contracts). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (describing one of the purposes of the Small Business Act as 
“insur[ing] that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property 
and services for the Government (including but not limited to contracts or subcontracts for 
maintenance, repair, and construction) [are] placed with small business enterprises”). The Small 
Business Act set an annual goal of awarding 23 percent of prime contract dollars to small 
businesses. Id. § 644(g)(1)(A)(1). 
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hope of compensation when it does. The surety may seek whatever 
future payments the prime contractor was due on the project as 
compensation for completing the job,67 in addition to whatever 
premium the contractor paid the surety up front to secure the bond 
agreement.68 As will be discussed in Part I.D, when a prime contractor 
defaults, the surety “stands in the shoes” of the principal69 and is 
entitled to receive the scheduled progress payments. 
A surety functions as a hybrid of a banking firm and a traditional 
insurance firm.70 Some commentators have compared sureties to 
banks,71 analogizing a bond to a conditional letter of credit or loan. This 
is because, in the event of contractor default, the surety would 
complete the project but seek compensation from the contractor.72 In 
other words, the terms of the bond may require the defaulting 
contractor to fully compensate the surety for completing the project. 
While comparing surety agreements to letters of credit is apt on 
its face, the practical effect of a contractor’s default belies that analogy. 
When a contractor defaults, it is often because the contractor has gone 
out of business.73 A surety cannot hope to recover blood from a stone. 
If a contractor goes out of business and has no ability to pay the surety, 
the surety is only compensated by the progress payments sent by the 
federal government and may suffer a financial loss on the project. In 
that respect, a surety functions more as an insurer, prepared to take a 
possible loss on a project. As with standard insurance, the principal 
must pay a premium to secure the surety’s bond. Moreover, like an 
 
 67. See Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 139 (1962) (noting that when the surety 
steps in and performs, it has a subrogation right to the remaining contract funds).  
 68. See Alber, supra note 48, at 1020 (noting that the surety receives a premium payment in 
exchange for agreeing to serve as the surety).  
 69. Kovars & Bernstein, supra note 20, at 24.  
 70. Nat’l Shawmut Bank of Bos. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843, 845 (1st Cir. 
1969) (“Neither is the business one of ordinary financing, for while the surety extends its credit 
to the owner . . . this is a credit that may either never have to be drawn upon or, if it is drawn upon 
at all, will in all likelihood be overdrawn.”); see B.C. Hart, Bad Faith Litigation Against Sureties, 
24 TORT & INS. L.J. 18, 19–20 (1988) (noting that the core relationships among parties to a surety 
agreement are different from relationships in typical insurance agreements).  
 71. See Wisner & Knox, supra note 15, at 244 (comparing a surety to a banker who “will 
make a loan only if satisfied that the borrower is creditworthy”).  
 72. Alber, supra note 48, at 1020–21. 
 73. See Donavan Bezer, The Inadequacy of Surety Bid Bonds in Public Construction 
Contracting, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 87, 130 (2010) (noting that contractors are often judgment proof, 
and that without a surety bond, a project owner would be left to sue a “bankrupt contractor that 
has defaulted on its contractual obligations”). 
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insurer, a surety’s financial obligation is triggered by a specific event—
in the surety’s case, the prime contractor’s default.74 
C. Miller Act Sureties 
Surety agreements have been a cornerstone of federal 
construction projects since 1894 when Congress passed the Heard 
Act.75 Prior to the enactment of the Heard Act, a subcontractor or 
supplier could not collect outstanding debts from a contractor because 
“a lien cannot attach to government property.”76 The Heard Act 
required the contractor to secure a bond on the project.77 The bond 
created a civil right of action against the prime contractor and the 
surety for unpaid labor and supplies, and it also enabled the federal 
government to require performance by the surety upon the 
contractor’s default.78 
In 1935, in an effort to strengthen the bond framework79 and 
subcontractor remedies provided by the Heard Act, Congress passed 
the Miller Act.80 The Miller Act differentiated between payment and 
performance bonds, and required the prime contractor to secure 
both.81 The Miller Act applied to a broad range of federal projects, 
affecting all contracts “for the construction, alteration, or repair of any 
public building or public work of the United States”82 whose cost 
exceeded $20,000 (later amended to $100,000).83 While ordinarily the 
federal government enjoys sovereign immunity, the Tucker Act, 
enacted in 1887, provides the Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction 
 
 74. Wisner & Knox, supra note 15, at 246.  
 75. Heard Act of 1894, ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278, repealed by Miller Act, Pub. L. No. 74-321, § 5, 
49 Stat. 793, 794 (1935).  
 76. See J.W. Bateson Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Bd. of Tr. Nat’l Automatic Sprinkler Indus. Pension 
Fund, 434 U.S. 586, 589 (1978) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 
417 U.S. 116, 122 (1974)).  
 77. Note, Reconsideration of Subrogative Rights of the Miller Act Payment Bond Surety, 71 
YALE L.J. 1274, 1277 n.18 (1962) (noting that the Heard Act required a single bond that included 
both payment and performance of the project).  
 78. Id.  
 79. H.R. REP. NO. 74-1263, at 1 (1935) (discussing the single bond framework from the 
Heard Act, which created “considerable complaint[s]” from subcontractors who sought to collect 
money due to them).  
 80. Miller Act, Pub. L. No. 74-321, § 1, 49 Stat. 793, 794 (1935) (current version at 40 U.S.C. 
§ 3131 (2012)). 
 81. Id. (requiring contractors to secure both payment and performance bonds).  
 82. Id.  
 83. Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3341 (1994) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 270) 
(current version at 40 U.S.C. § 3131).  
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to hear a suit brought by a contractor or a surety against the federal 
government when there is a contract dispute.84 
D. Progress Payments and the Doctrine of Equitable Subrogation 
Given the risk that problems could arise during performance, 
contractors on government construction projects are not typically paid 
in a full lump sum. However, many contractors could not complete 
massive, multi-million-dollar construction projects without revenue 
during performance.85 Small-business contractors in particular would 
struggle to complete a project without consistent cash flow, reducing 
competition during the government bidding process because “only the 
largest and most fluid businesses would be financially able to invest 
their own capital or arrange for private financing.”86 
Thus, as a result of the federal government’s desire to encourage 
accountability on the jobsite and promote small-business contractors,87 
contractors receive progress payments. Progress payments are periodic 
payments for work completed,88 and are generally made month-by-
month. Progress payments encourage contractors to perform work 
promptly and to specification, because the contractor’s payment will 
be tied to accurate completion of the project. The government official 
who manages the particular construction project certifies progress 
payments and sends payments to the contractor.89 For instance, if a 
contractor paves cement and installs roofing at a military base, it will 
submit an invoice for the value of work completed and supplies used in 
that month to an Army officer at the base. Federal regulations require 
 
 84. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012); see Ins. Co. of the W. v. United States, 243 F.3d 
1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]fter stepping into the shoes of a . . . contractor, [the surety] may 
rely on the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act . . . .”). 
 85. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 842, 846 (D. Kan. 1973) (“It 
is common knowledge that contractors rely upon contract proceeds administered through 
progress payments to properly finance the contract.”).  
 86. Paul Maurice Meador, Financing Government Contracts with Progress Payments, 18 A.F. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (1976).  
 87. Id. at 2–4 (noting that promoting small business contractors is a goal of federal 
procurement policy and that progress payments help facilitate that goal).  
 88. Depending on the type of project, progress payments may take the form of payment for 
costs incurred during the specified period, or as a percent of the total contract. See FAR 32.102(b), 
(e) (2015) (comparing progress payments made based on costs with progress payments made 
based on percent of project completed).  
 89. See id. at 1.602-2 (describing the job duties of a contracting officer as “ensuring 
performance of all necessary actions for effective contracting, ensuring compliance with the terms 
of the contract, and safeguarding the interests of the United States in its contractual 
relationships”).  
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that once the federal agency overseeing the work receives a proper 
invoice from the contractor for work completed, the agency must 
submit a payment to the prime contractor.90 Because the federal 
government has no contractual relationship with the suppliers or 
subcontractors, the prime contractor receives the full progress 
payment and allocates the funds to its suppliers and subcontractors.91 
If the contractor’s work is advancing by the terms of the contract, 
all payments are made to the contractor and there is little need for the 
surety. The trouble arises when the surety believes the prime 
contractor is struggling to perform. When contractors are involved in 
multiple projects at once, their finances can become strained if they use 
revenue from one project to finance another project, possibly leaving 
subcontractors and suppliers waiting for payment.92 In more serious 
cases of financial turmoil, the contractor may pack up and walk off the 
job site, signaling that the firm does not intend to complete the 
project.93 If either of these problems occurs, a subcontractor may 
contact the surety and complain that the prime contractor is failing to 
perform adequately. 
When the contractor has defaulted, the surety naturally seeks to 
mitigate its potential loss on the project. The doctrine of equitable 
subrogation provides the surety with a remedy, entitling the surety to 
all future progress payments that would ordinarily go to the (defaulted) 
prime contractor. Rooted neither in statute nor in contract language,94 
 
 90. See id. at 32.904 (2013) (“The due date for making progress payments based on 
contracting officer approval of the estimated amount and value of work or services performed, 
including payments for reaching milestones in any project, is 14 days after the designated billing 
office receives a proper payment request.”).  
 91. See id. at 32.112-1 (describing subcontractor payment as the contractor’s responsibility).  
 92. See Scott Wolfe, Jr., Getting Paid in the Construction Industry: A War Between Policy, 
Contract, and Tempers, ZLIEN: CONSTRUCTION PAYMENT BLOG (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www. 
zlien.com/articles/getting-paid-in-the-construction-industry-a-war-between-policy-contract-and-
tempers [https://perma.cc/6BC2-2GTG] (noting that the uncertainty in construction projects 
encourages some contractors to apply money from one project to another project, or “robbing 
Peter to pay Paul”).  
 93. See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 590, 593 (1987) (stating that after 
most of the subcontractors had walked off the job site, “it was obvious to everyone” that the 
contractor would be unable to complete performance).  
 94. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136 n.12 (1962) (noting that equitable 
subrogation “is a creature of equity; is enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the ends 
of substantial justice; and is independent of any contractual relations between the 
parties” (quoting Memphis & Little Rock R.R. Co. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 301–02 (1887))).  
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equitable subrogation is a long-standing doctrine95 that springs from 
the principle of unjust enrichment.96 If the government were to demand 
that the surety discharge the duty of the contractor, yet retain the 
planned progress payments, the government would be unjustly 
enriched.97 As a result, equitable subrogation allows the surety to step 
into the shoes of the principal (prime contractor), entitling the surety 
to all the funds the contractor would receive.98 Upon the surety’s 
successful completion of the project (or plan to successfully complete 
the project), the surety is entitled to receive the unpaid progress 
payments that would have gone to the contractor.99 
When applied as described here, equitable subrogation does not 
prejudice the federal government’s interest in the project because the 
job will be completed and the government simply pays out the 
remaining contract funds directly to the surety.100 When that standard 
 
 95. See id. at 136 (“Since there is no statute which expressly declares that a surety does 
acquire a property interest in a fund like this . . . we must seek an answer in prior judicial 
decisions.”).  
 96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability.”).  
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR., § 27 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1996) 
(describing subrogation as a remedy by which “the property of one person is used to discharge a 
duty of another . . . under such circumstances that the other will be unjustly enriched by the 
retention . . . thus conferred, the former is placed in the position of the obligee”).  
 98. Ins. Co. of the W. v. United States, 243 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]fter stepping 
into the shoes of a . . . contractor, [the surety] may rely on the waiver of sovereign immunity in 
the Tucker Act . . . .”). Note that some commentators describe the subrogation right as allowing 
the contractor to step into the shoes of the obligee (the federal government) rather than the 
principal (contractor). But for the purposes of analyzing progress payments under Balboa, it is a 
semantic distinction without a difference. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR., 
§ 27 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1996) (“In the suretyship context, subrogation provides a secondary 
obligor who performs the secondary obligation with the obligee’s rights with respect to the 
underlying obligation as though that obligation had not been satisfied.”). 
 99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR., § 27(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1996) 
(“Upon total satisfaction of the underlying obligation, the [surety] is subrogated to all rights of 
the obligee with respect to the underlying obligation to the extent that performance of the 
secondary obligation contributed to the satisfaction.”); see Daniel Mungall, Jr., The Buffeting of 
the Subrogation Rights of the Construction Contract Bond Surety by United States v. Munsey 
Trust Co., 46 INS. COUNS. J., 607, 607 (1979) (noting that the right of equitable subrogation 
involves four elements: “1. An obligation of the contractor to the owner; 2. The failure of the 
contractor to perform that obligation; 3. Rights in the owner arising from the contractor’s failure 
to perform; 4. The performance by the surety . . . of the obligation which the contractor has failed 
to perform”).  
 100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUAR., § 27 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1996) 
(“Since the underlying obligation has been satisfied, no interest of the obligee is prejudiced by 
permitting the secondary obligor to enforce the obligee’s rights, and the resulting benefit to the 
secondary obligor effectuates the rights of the secondary obligor against the principal obligor.”). 
HAWKINS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  10:02 AM 
2016] (IN)EQUITABLE SUBROGATION 443 
version of equitable subrogation occurs, the project can be completed 
largely on schedule, and litigation between the surety and the federal 
government is unlikely. 
However, many cases of contractor “default” are not so 
straightforward.101 Contractor delays on large-scale construction 
projects are not unusual, and delays do not necessarily signal that the 
contractor will fail to complete the project.102 Suppose the surety 
notifies the government official that it is concerned with subcontractor 
payment complaints and the project’s schedule. The surety is 
convinced it will eventually need to take over the project, and it seeks 
to receive payment as soon as possible. The surety requests that the 
federal government stop sending progress payments to the contractor 
and begin the process of routing those payments toward the surety. If 
the contractor has successfully completed 90 percent of the project, 
with only a few small cosmetic improvements still to come, the 
government official may plausibly believe that the contractor will get 
back on schedule and finish the job without incident.103 Relying on the 
contractor’s assurances that it will complete the job, the government 
official makes a contractually obligated progress payment to the 
contractor over the surety’s objection. Under the Court of Federal 
Claims’ holding in Balboa, if the government official guesses 
incorrectly and the contractor defaults, the surety may sue the federal 
government to retroactively recover the recent progress payment that 
was sent to the contractor.104 If the federal government loses at trial, it 
is forced to pay twice for work by issuing a new payment to the surety. 
The government is unlikely to recover any money from the judgment-
proof defaulted contractor.105 To sue under this theory, the surety must 
have provided notice to the federal government that the contractor was 
 
 101. See, e.g., Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing 
the contract’s performance as 91 percent complete and on schedule when the surety first raised 
concerns).  
 102. Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1858 (2005); see also Sanford M. Fitzsimmons & Abraham Goldfarb, Schweigert and Delays of 
Second-Tier Subcontractors, 11 JAG L. REV. 321, 322 (1969) (noting that the Court of Federal 
Claims has held that delays that were the fault of a second-tier subcontractor do not constitute 
default by the contractor).   
 103. See, e.g., Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1165 (describing the project as more than 90 percent 
complete when the surety complained to the government official).  
 104. Id. at 1162 (noting that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear this type of 
lawsuit). 
 105. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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in default “or approaching default,”106 and that the surety was 
“invoking its rights to the remaining contract proceeds.”107 Once the 
surety has provided notice, the government is “convert[ed] . . . into a 
stakeholder with duties to the surety.”108 
Although it recognized a surety’s right to sue to recover allegedly 
misdirected progress payments, the Court of Federal Claims struggled 
to articulate a standard by which the government’s decisions regarding 
progress payments would be evaluated.109 After all, the federal 
government does not contract with the sureties themselves, and 
ordinarily a third party’s warning or concern does not affect 
contractual relations between two parties. Furthermore, the federal 
government is bound by contracts and regulations to make prompt 
progress payments to its contractors.110 Moreover, courts have noted 
that the federal government has a strong interest in the “timely and 
efficient” completion of construction projects, giving federal 
government officials “broad discretion and flexibility” in making 
payments.111 
Throughout the 1970s, the Court of Federal Claims relied on 
vague language about duty to guide a fact-based inquiry into the 
government’s decision to issue progress payments.112 The court held 
that a government official assumes a “duty to exercise its discretion 
responsibly and to consider the surety’s interest in conjunction with 
other problems encountered in the administration of the contract” 
after the surety notifies the government of the risk of default.113 In 1985, 
in Balboa Insurance Co. v. United States114 the Federal Circuit 
attempted to create a more precise framework to assess federal 
discretion over progress payments. 
 
 106. Colonial Sur. Co. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 622, 634 (2013).   
 107. Am. Ins. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 151, 155 (2004). 
 108. Id.; see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 525, 535 (2012) (“[N]otice 
that the contractor is in default and that the surety is invoking its rights to the remaining contract 
proceeds converts the government into a stakeholder with duties to the surety.”). 
 109. For examples of this difficulty, see generally U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 676 
F.2d 622, 631 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 529 F.2d 1312, 1321 (Ct. Cl. 1976); 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1377, 1385 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. 
United States, 434 F.2d 1362, 1366, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1970).  
 110. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  
 111. Argonaut Ins. Co., 434 F.2d at 1367–68; U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 676 F.2d at 628. 
 112. See Argonaut Ins. Co., 434 F.2d at 1368 (suggesting that the government has a duty to 
consider the surety’s interest during performance of the contract).  
 113. Id.  
 114. Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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II.  BALBOA AND ITS DEFICIENCIES 
Attempting to find an equitable solution to fact-driven progress 
payment litigation, the Federal Circuit cobbled together a complex, 
eight-factor framework to assess a government official’s decision to pay 
a contractor over a surety’s objection. The Balboa framework is 
irrational and practically unworkable, and it imposes a convoluted and 
burdensome inquiry on low-level government officials. The Miller Act 
was designed in large part to protect the federal government from cost 
increases associated with construction projects,115 yet ironically the 
Balboa framework that emerged from the statute threatens the federal 
government with the risk of double payment and imposes a constant 
litigation risk. 
A. Balboa’s “Reasonable Discretion” Framework 
In 1979, contractor Chemical Engineers & Constructors, Inc. 
(CEC) was hired to alter a structure at the Naval Training Center in 
Orlando, Florida.116 Balboa Insurance Company served as the project’s 
surety, and CEC provided the government with proof of its payment 
and performance bonds.117 In January 1980, CEC was on schedule, had 
completed 91 percent of the project, and had received four progress 
payments.118 In early February, the surety received complaints from 
subcontractors who said they had not been paid for work performed 
and that CEC would not be able to fulfill its obligations.119 When CEC 
requested its fifth progress payment from the Navy, the surety 
“demand[ed] that no further contract funds be released without its 
consent.”120 Notwithstanding the surety’s objection, the Navy opted to 
disburse a progress payment to CEC for work that had been 
performed.121 After subcontractors and suppliers complained that they 
had not been paid for their work,122 the government terminated CEC 
for default in June 1980.123 Balboa stepped in and paid the 
 
 115. See Palladino & Clarke, supra note 11, at 645 (explaining that performance bonds 
“ensur[e] that the Government will receive a completed project at the price set forth in the 
underlying contract”). 
 116. Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1159.  
 117. Id. at 1159–60.  
 118. Id. at 1160.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 1162.  
 123. Id. at 1160. 
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subcontractors and suppliers CEC had failed to pay.124 Balboa sued the 
federal government to recover the fifth progress payment made over 
its objection, arguing that Balboa was forced to make CEC’s payments 
to suppliers.125 
The Court of Federal Claims awarded summary judgment to the 
government. The court held that because the project was on schedule 
when the contested progress payment was made, the government’s 
decision to pay CEC was reasonable as a matter of law.126 Balboa 
appealed to the Federal Circuit. 
The Federal Circuit first grappled with whether the court had 
jurisdiction over the surety’s suit to recover a misdirected progress 
payment. The court rejected the federal government’s argument that 
because the government “owe[d] no duty to protect the surety from its 
principal,” the contractor, the government need not consider the 
surety’s interests when making progress payments.127 Instead, the court 
relied on the doctrine of equitable subrogation to hold that once a 
surety notifies the government of possible contractor default, the 
government “becomes a stakeholder with a duty of acting with 
reasoned discretion.”128 The court held that in any transaction in which 
the government is a stakeholder in the surety’s interests, the Court of 
Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear the surety’s claim.129 
After establishing that the court had jurisdiction, the Federal 
Circuit addressed the standard of review for assessing the government 
official’s decision. To prevail, the surety would need to establish that 
the government official’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious” and 
an “abuse of discretion.”130 Traditionally, this standard is extremely 
 
 124. Id. at 1160 n.1.  
 125. Id. at 1160.  
 126. Id. at 1164.  
 127. Id. at 1160.  
 128. Id. at 1162.  
 129. Id. at 1163. 
 130. See id. at 1164 (finding that “[t]he standard of proof to be applied in a case where an 
arbitrary and capricious disregard of the surety’s interests, and an abuse of discretion, are charged 
must be, and is, high” (alteration in original) (quoting Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 529 
F.2d 1312, 1320 (Ct. Cl. 1976))). Note that the court in Balboa puzzlingly suggested that the surety 
needs to establish both that the decision was “arbitrary and capricious” and that it was an “abuse 
of discretion,” though the APA only requires a showing of one or the other. Compare id. 
(requiring a finding of both arbitrariness and an abuse of discretion for plaintiff surety to prevail), 
with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (permitting courts to set aside an agency’s action upon a showing 
of either abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious action).  
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deferential and presumes that the government’s action is valid.131 The 
standard is intended to ensure that the government’s process for 
deciding is “within the bounds of reasoned decision making.”132 
The Federal Circuit outlined eight factors that could be used to 
assess whether a government official exercised “reasonable discretion” 
in making a contested payment. Prior to Balboa, there was no unified 
framework to assess the government official’s decision. Instead, the 
Court of Federal Claims had relied on individual factors in a series of 
one-off cases.133 Rather than create a framework from scratch, the 
Federal Circuit in Balboa considered many factors that had been used 
individually in prior cases to synthesize one framework.134 The eight 
factors were: 
(1) “Attempts by the Government after notification by the surety, to 
determine that the contractor had the capacity and intent to complete 
the job.”135  
(2) “Percentage of contract performance completed at the time of 
notification by the surety.”136 
(3) “Efforts of the Government to determine the progress made on 
the contract after notice by the surety.”137  
 
 131. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 469, 471 (1986) (describing both the abuse of discretion standard and the arbitrary and 
capricious standard as “instruct[ing] the court to tolerate a high risk of error and to approach the 
administrative decision with a restrained critical attitude”).  
 132. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 104 (1983).  
 133. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 676 F.2d 622, 631 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (discussing 
the importance of the government officer determining that the contractor had the capacity and 
intent to complete the project); Royal Indem. Co., 529 F.2d at 1321 (discussing the importance of 
the government officer assessing the progress made on the contract, after notice by the surety); 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1377, 1385 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (discussing whether the 
progress payment subsequently reached the subcontractors); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. United 
States, 434 F.2d 1362, 1366, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (discussing whether the contract was subsequently 
completed by the contractor); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 842, 848 (D. 
Kan. 1973) (discussing the importance of the government officer determining that the contractor 
had the capacity and intent to complete the project). 
 134. Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1165 (“The Claims Court neither considered nor evaluated Balboa’s 
evidence addressed to the above-enumerated factors.”). 
 135. Id. at 1164 (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 676 F.2d at 631; Royal Indem. Co., 529 F.2d at 
1321; Argonaut Ins. Co., 434 F.2d at 1366, 1369; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 362 F. Supp. at 848). 
 136. Id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 676 F.2d at 631; U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 475 F.2d at 
1385; Argonaut Ins. Co., 434 F.2d at 1366). 
 137. Id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 676 F.2d at 631; Royal Indem. Co., 529 F.2d at 1320–
21). 
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(4) “Whether the contract was subsequently completed by the 
contractor . . . .”138  
(5) “Whether the payments to the contractor subsequently reached 
the subcontractors and [suppliers] . . . .”139  
(6) “Whether the Government contracting agency had notice of 
problems with the contractor’s performance previous to the surety’s 
notification of default to the Government.”140 
(7) “Whether the Government’s action violates one of its own statutes 
or regulations.”141  
(8) “Evidence that the contract could or could not be completed as 
quickly or cheaply by a successor contractor.”142  
Because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding these 
eight factors, the case was remanded for further fact-finding, and it 
appears that the case was settled.143 Nonetheless, since it was decided, 
Balboa’s framework has been cited in more than one hundred cases.144 
B. Problems with Balboa’s Framework 
Although the Balboa decision represents a well-intentioned 
attempt to equitably solve a complex problem, the factors the Federal 
Circuit approved are plagued with problems. Given the framework’s 
internal contradictions, its lack of clarity about how to weigh factors 
against each other, and its notable inclusion of irrelevant factors, the 
 
 138. Id. at 1164–65 (citing Argonaut Ins. Co., 434 F.2d at 1369).  
 139. Id. at 1165 (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 475 F.2d at 1385; Argonaut Ins. Co., 434 F.2d at 
1369). 
 140. Id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 475 F.2d at 1385). 
 141. Id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 676 F.2d at 630).  
 142. Id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 676 F.2d at 631; Royal Indem. Co., 529 F.2d at 
1321; Argonaut Ins. Co., 434 F.2d at 1369). 
 143. Diligent searching did not produce any record of Balboa on remand, and no later Balboa-
factor cases mention the Balboa trial court assessing the application of the Federal Circuit’s 
factors. Balboa was discussed at a surety claims conference in which the speaker said the parties 
settled. See David C. Romm & Robert G. Watt, Surety Recourse Against the Owner for the Non-
Performing Principal, or, How to Get Back Those Progress Payments, Northeast Surety & 
Fidelity Claims Conference 15 (Nov. 7, 1991), http://www.forcon.com/userfiles/file/nesfcc/
1991/03.Romm.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9P3-3ERZ] (explaining that Balboa “was settled by the 
parties before a decision on the merits was rendered”). 
 144. Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States: Citing References, WESTLAWNEXT, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com [https://perma.cc/B4GJ-UUB3] (type “775 F.2d 1158” into the search 
box, click on “Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States” link in search results, scroll over “Citing 
References” tab and click on “Cases”) (listing 128 cases that cite Balboa).  
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standard is irrational for use in resolving surety disputes. Moreover, 
the framework is unworkable in practice, inefficiently shifting costs to 
the party with less information and saddling the federal government 
with the risk of continued litigation. Balboa’s progress-payment 
framework contorts a statute that was designed to protect the 
government’s interests on costly construction projects into a tool to 
extract double payment from the government for work performed. 
Thus, Balboa’s progress-payment framework is fundamentally flawed. 
1. Balboa’s Framework is Irrational for Resolving Surety Disputes.  
First, two of the Balboa factors are irrelevant to assessing whether the 
government official acted with “reasonable discretion” when deciding 
whether to make the progress payment to the contractor. Balboa’s 
fourth and fifth factors ask whether the project was subsequently 
completed by the original contractor and whether the payments to the 
contractor subsequently reached the subcontractors. The “arbitrary, 
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”145 standard is designed to assess 
an agency’s decisionmaking process.146 Therefore, the reasonableness 
of the government’s decision can only be logically assessed based on 
the information the government knew or should have known at the 
time the payment was made. However, the fourth and fifth Balboa 
factors require the court to engage in a post hoc review, using 
information that the government official would not, and could not, 
have had available when the progress payment was made. Determining 
whether the government’s decisionmaking process was reasonable is 
an independent inquiry from assessing the results of that decision. 
Second, the seventh Balboa factor asks the court to assess whether 
the agency’s payment decision violates any statute or regulation. On its 
face, this factor seems reasonable, but it ignores the surety’s premise in 
bringing suit. The FAR requires the federal government to make 
prompt progress payments to the contractor for work completed.147 
The agency must make the payment within fourteen days of receiving 
an invoice from the contractor, and there is no exception to this 
requirement for situations in which the surety requests that the agency 
 
 145. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).   
 146. See Koch, supra note 131, at 508 (noting that the abuse of discretion standard looks only 
at the “soundness of the discretionary decisionmaking process”).   
 147. FAR 32.904 (2013) (“The due date for making progress payments based on contracting 
officer approval of the estimated amount and value of work or services performed, including 
payments for reaching milestones in any project, is 14 days after the designated billing office 
receives a proper payment request.”).  
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stop payment or redirect the payment toward the surety.148 Including a 
factor to assess whether the government official’s decision violated 
regulations is irrational because abiding by the FAR was a necessary 
precondition to the suit arising. If the agency had decided to suspend 
progress payments for completed work and redirect the payment 
toward the surety—avoiding a Balboa suit entirely—the agency would 
have violated the FAR. While this factor could be helpful in assessing 
the agency’s compliance with other regulations, it seemingly overlooks 
FAR provisions on progress payments. Compounding this catch-22 
situation for government officials is the fact that the Balboa court 
indicated that no one factor is dispositive.149 Balboa’s framework 
puzzlingly suggests that a court could conclude that the federal 
government did not exercise “reasonable discretion” in making a 
progress payment, even though not making the progress payment 
would have violated the FAR. 
Finally, the court provided no mechanism to weigh the factors 
against each other. Instead, the factors were cobbled together from a 
series of one-off cases with unique facts. Weighing the Balboa factors 
is particularly challenging because the factors vary significantly in their 
scope. Some factors are quantitative,150 others involve subjective 
efforts by the government official,151 still others involve an objective 
hindsight test.152 Relying on Balboa, courts have decided cases by 
vaguely concluding that “the weight” tipped in one party’s direction,153 
yet the framework is silent as to which factors are more persuasive. 
This inhibits government agencies from assessing what “reasonable 
discretion” entails prior to litigation arising, opening the door for more 
costly disputes. 
The Court of Federal Claims has also reached differing 
conclusions about whether a Balboa analysis is dispositive. Generally, 
the court has held that Balboa’s factors are the dispositive framework 
for assessing whether a government official exercised reasonable 
 
 148. Id.  
 149. Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 150. Factor 2: How significant is it that the project was already 91 percent complete when the 
surety warned the government of default? See id. at 1164. 
 151. Factor 1: How well did the government attempt to determine if the contractor had the 
capacity and intent to complete the job? See id. 
 152. Factor 5: Did the payments to the contractor subsequently reach the subcontractors? See 
id. at 1165 
 153. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 555, 560 (1989) (holding that the weight 
of the evidence tipped in favor of the plaintiff surety).  
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discretion.154 Yet at other times, the court has maintained that the 
factors “are not in themselves conclusive” and has suggested that even 
when the weight of the factors “decidedly tip” in favor of the plaintiff 
surety, there may not have been an abuse of discretion.155 Given its lack 
of clarity on how to weigh the factors, and even whether the framework 
is dispositive, Balboa is not a rational standard for assessing progress 
payments. 
2. Balboa’s Framework is Unworkable in Practice.  Balboa also 
presents a framework that is inefficient and difficult to apply. The 
Balboa framework is inefficient because the surety is in a better 
position than the federal government to assess the principal’s risk of 
default. Because a surety bases its premium on a risk assessment of the 
project, it has an incentive to speak with the contractor about its 
relationships with subcontractors and suppliers prior to reaching a 
bond agreement.156 If the surety is concerned that the contractor is 
unreliable or liable to skip payments to subcontractors, the surety can 
price that risk into the premium it charges the contractor for its bond 
services.157 The surety can rely on its relationship with the contractor 
and its knowledge of the contractor’s relationship with its 
subcontractors to assess the risk on the project. 
In contrast, when awarding a contract, the federal government 
contracts only with the prime contractor, not its subcontractors.158 The 
government official has no direct contact with the project’s 
subcontractors, either before the project begins or during 
performance.159 Yet the Balboa framework places the onus on the 
federal government to predict possible subcontractor concerns when 
 
 154. See Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 308, 315 (1994) 
(describing Balboa’s eight factors as the method of “test[ing] the reasonableness” of the 
government official’s decision).  
 155. United Pac. Ins. Co., 16 Cl. Ct. at 560. 
 156. See, e.g., Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1165 (describing the fifth and sixth factors as requiring the 
government official to assess subcontractor payment and contractor performance).  
 157. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SEC., § 82 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1941) (defining a 
“compensated surety” as a surety that receives a premium based on a “computation of risks on 
an actuarial basis”). 
 158. Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1160 (“In contrast to a subcontractor, which has no obligations 
running directly to or from the Government . . . a surety, as bondholder, is as much a party to the 
Government contract as the contractor.” (citation omitted)). 
 159. See Steven W. Feldman, Get a Grip: How to Handle Government Contracts and Tame the 
Fury of Federal Forms, 40 TENN. B.J. 14, 24–25 (2004) (noting that generally speaking, a 
subcontractor “should expect little involvement” from the federal government in disputes with 
the prime contractor). 
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choosing to make progress payments to the prime contractor.160 
Because the federal government has an informational disadvantage in 
assessing the risk of subcontractor payment problems, the burden 
should be placed on the surety to price the risk into the premium 
charged to contractors. 
Second, the complexity of the factors puts a government official in 
a difficult position. The government official in charge of submitting 
contractor payments is typically a low-level agency official who may be 
juggling many other projects.161 The official faces a “task of balancing 
the Government’s interests in proceeding with the contract, against 
possible harm to the surety.”162 Under Balboa, before making a 
contractually obligated progress payment, the government official 
must assess not only the status of the project (Factors 2, 6), but also the 
contractor’s mental state (Factor 1), the status of subcontractors with 
whom the government has no contractual relationship (Factor 5), and 
also the likelihood that another contractor could replace the current 
one at below cost (Factor 8), among others. Thus, the “equitable” 
Balboa framework that emerged out of a statute designed in large part 
to protect the federal government actually imposes significant 
hardships on those officials. 
Moreover, the Miller Act’s other goal of protecting subcontractors 
is not better served by imposing a rigorous test on government officials. 
A court’s assessment of the Balboa factors does not affect whether the 
subcontractors and suppliers receive payment for work performed. 
The payment bond guarantees that they will be paid. The court’s 
assessment of the Balboa factors merely determines whether the surety 
will be reimbursed for a progress payment the government sent to the 
contractor prior to default. With or without the government official 
considering the complex Balboa factors, the subcontractors will be paid 
for their work. 
The hardships the Balboa framework imposes may also push the 
government to settle otherwise meritless claims. Weighing the eight 
 
 160. See Balboa, 775 F.2d at 1162 (holding that the federal government becomes a 
“stakeholder” and must choose whether to make further progress payments to the contractor, 
after the surety notifies the government of potential default).  
 161. See Krent, supra note 22, at 1567 (noting that contracting officers with the power to 
terminate a contract may be at a “low level”).  
 162. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1377, 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1973).  
HAWKINS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  10:02 AM 
2016] (IN)EQUITABLE SUBROGATION 453 
Balboa factors is extremely fact-intensive.163 To assess what 
information the government official had available, the parties would 
need to engage in extensive discovery to comb through e-mails, 
minutes from meetings, status updates from jobsites, and complaints 
from subcontractors. The greater the risk of imposing costly discovery 
on a party, the greater the risk that the party will be forced to settle a 
meritless claim.164 Given the high costs of defending a Balboa suit, the 
federal government may be forced to settle with the surety. Perhaps as 
a result of the costly nature of litigating a Balboa claim, there are only 
two post-Balboa Federal Circuit decisions applying each of the eight 
factors.165 
However, the lack of post-Balboa decisions does not indicate that 
the framework is successful. To the contrary, excessive settling not only 
costs taxpayers money, but it exacerbates the problem by leaving the 
federal government with little case law demonstrating how to contest 
the surety’s arguments on each of the factors and without data on the 
government’s chances of success at trial. If the complex framework 
created just results, then its costs to parties attempting to litigate such 
cases may fairly be judged as reasonable. But when a complicated 
framework creates serious obstacles to defending lawsuits, forcing the 
government to settle potentially meritless claims, the framework ought 
to be eliminated in favor of something simpler. 
Moreover, it is unclear precisely how much Balboa lawsuits cost 
taxpayers. The cost of settling is borne by the Department of Justice 
Judgment Fund,166 but the Judgment Fund records do not itemize 
payouts for Balboa lawsuits.167 Tucker Act payouts broadly have 
totaled more than $448 million since 2002, not including the costs of 
 
 163. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 525, 537 (2012) (denying the 
government’s motion to dismiss and noting that a Balboa analysis is a factual determination that 
must be assessed at trial).  
 164. Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 740 (1995). 
 165. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 555, 558–61 (1989); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 590, 594–96 (1987). Other cases cite Balboa, but only these two Federal 
Circuit cases apply the analysis factor-by-factor.  
 166. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012) (creating the Judgment Fund to pay court judgments and 
Department of Justice settlements).  
 167. Judgment Fund Payment Search, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., https://jfund.fms.treas.gov/jfrad
SearchWeb/JFPymtSearchAction.do [https://perma.cc/22NW-UWZG] (showing a nonitemized 
list for any suits arising under the Tucker Act, which is the statute that Balboa litigants rely on 
jurisdictionally for the waiver of sovereign immunity). 
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discovery and Department of Justice attorneys’ time.168 Although it is 
unclear precisely how much the federal government loses on Balboa 
cases, defending the government’s decision in relation to eight vague 
factors is likely costly. The Miller Act was enacted to protect 
subcontractors and the federal government, but the complex Balboa 
framework does not advance either goal. 
III.  REPLACING BALBOA WITH A REASONABLE-ASSURANCES 
STANDARD 
The Federal Circuit should eliminate the irrational and 
unworkable Balboa framework in favor of a clearer standard that is 
easier to administer and provides more certainty. There are two 
possible contractor-default scenarios, each of which should be treated 
differently. In the first instance, if a contractor defaults without any 
forewarning by the surety, the surety must step in and perform per the 
terms of the bonds. In such cases, the surety should be entitled to all 
future progress payments owed to the contractor, but it may not 
recover from the federal government for any payments that were 
already made to the contractor, absent a showing that the government 
official made the payment with a fraudulent intent. In other words, 
unless the government official believes that he or she is authorizing a 
payment that will not be used to pay for the project’s legitimate costs 
per the contract,169 a regularly scheduled progress payment to the 
contractor cannot be challenged when the surety did not provide notice 
of imminent default. 
In the second scenario, if the surety notifies the federal 
government that it believes contractor default is imminent, the 
government official must seek reasonable assurances from the 
contractor that it has the intent and capacity to complete the job. 
Unlike the Balboa framework, which requires the government official 
to overcome a hindsight test and obtain significant information from 
 
 168. Id. (selecting the date range of 10/01/2002 through 12/11/2015, clicking “add all” 
defendant agencies and including “28USC1491-Tucker Act- ClaimsCt” in the “Optional Search 
Field,” lists the total litigation payments as $448,611,876.81). 
 169. This standard echoes the standard espoused by the Court of Federal Claims at the trial 
court Balboa hearing, which was overturned by the Federal Circuit when it created the eight 
factors. The trial court held that without “proof of . . . deliberate or fraudulent conduct,” the 
government official’s conduct could not be challenged. Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 
1158, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1985). But unlike the prescription recommended in this Note, the trial court 
held that it was immaterial whether the surety put the government official on notice of the 
possibility of imminent default. Id. 
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subcontractors, this new framework would enable the federal 
government to seek assurances from the only party it contracted with: 
the prime contractor. The government official would lean on the 
contractor to provide information about the project’s status and 
subcontractor performance. The precise contours of this form of due 
diligence should be subject to rulemaking and included in the FAR. In 
order to ensure that the contractor will provide genuine assurances, 
rather than bluff,170 the construction contract could contain a penalty 
clause. The penalty clause would stipulate that if the contractor 
ultimately defaulted after reassuring the government in light of the 
surety’s warning, the contractor would pay a monetary penalty that it 
had set aside at the beginning of the project.171  
This new framework serves several purposes. First, it effectuates 
one of the Miller Act’s primary goals—protecting the federal 
government’s interest in construction projects—without harming the 
second goal of protecting subcontractors.172 The Miller Act sought to 
use sureties as a shield to protect the federal government’s interests, 
but the Balboa framework ironically created a sword for sureties to use 
against the federal government. FAR rulemaking clarifying how the 
government official can seek reasonable assurances from the 
contractor, rather than an irrational and complex framework crafted 
by judges, would reduce the risk of double payments by introducing 
certainty into the process. 
Second, requiring government officials to seek reasonable 
assurances is a workable alternative to Balboa’s contradictory and 
amorphous eight-factor test. No longer could a court hold that a 
government official following the FAR failed to exercise “reasonable 
discretion”; nor would the federal government be unfairly penalized 
using a hindsight test. Additionally, the federal government would not 
be pressured into settling potentially meritless claims for fear that 
litigating an eight-factor test would prove too burdensome. 
Moreover, the new standard would take advantage of the surety’s 
informational advantage by triggering due diligence by the government 
 
 170. See KXMDTV11, Han Solo All Fine Here, YOUTUBE (Oct. 29, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYAbFqkvzQA [https://perma.cc/8ZKU-32EM] (showing a 
scene from STAR WARS (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1977) in which a disguised Han Solo attempts to reassure 
a stormtrooper that the situation is under control).  
 171. The contractor would be required to set aside this penalty amount at the outset of the 
construction project, ensuring that the penalty will be paid if the contractor defaults after 
providing assurances to the federal government.  
 172. See supra Part I.B–C.  
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official when the surety notifies the government that default may be 
imminent. The surety is in a strong position to predict default problems 
on a project, and the surety will be rewarded for its efforts to notify the 
government. 
Some may argue that the proposed solution harms sureties by 
limiting their ability to mitigate losses on a project. It is true that by 
simplifying the framework, new FAR regulations would likely grant 
more discretion to government officials. However, the surety already 
has the ability to price the risk of contractor default into the premium 
it charges the contractor for its bond services. Because the surety has 
an ongoing relationship with the contractor and its subcontractors,173 
the surety can base its premium fee on its assessment of the risk of 
default. In contrast, the federal government’s procurement process is 
geared toward accepting the lowest-priced technically acceptable 
bid,174 and the government typically has no relationship with a 
contractor’s subcontractors. Moreover, when the contractor’s default 
was not due to its going out of business, the surety may sue the 
contractor to recover the contractor’s assets per the terms of the bond. 
There is also a minimal risk that encouraging the surety to price 
the risk of default into the bond agreement will raise the cost of 
contracting for the federal government overall. But bond agreements 
will only cost the contractor more to the extent that the contractor is a 
default risk. If a surety is wary of bonding a project for a particular 
contractor, such that the bond cost would make the contractor’s bid on 
the project higher than that of other contractors, then the contractor 
would be underbid by competitors. A different contractor with less risk 
of default could secure a bond at a reasonable price, and would be in a 
position to submit a lower bid to the federal government. In any event, 
the potential savings to the federal government—avoiding double 
payment on massive progress payments175—should outweigh the 
potential for slightly higher bids on projects. 
 
 173. See Nagle & DeMella, supra note 14, at 15 (noting that sureties are active in resolving 
on-site disputes between the contractor and subcontractor).  
 174. FAR 15.101-2 (2012) (enabling agencies to use cost as the sole criterion for selecting bids 
that meet minimum technical specifications). 
 175. See, e.g., United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 555, 556 (1989) (noting that the 
two disputed payments totaled $486,000).  
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CONCLUSION 
The Miller Act was largely intended to protect the federal 
government during tremendously costly construction projects, yet the 
Federal Circuit’s Balboa framework creates a continual threat of 
double payment. The “equitable” framework is irrational in the 
context of surety disputes, and is unworkable in practice. With renewed 
momentum for modern construction infrastructure,176 it is time to retire 
Balboa’s cumbersome, thirty-year-old framework. New rulemaking 
should amend the FAR to clarify that a government official merely 
must seek reasonable assurances from a contractor when a surety 
notifies the government that default may be imminent. 
 
 
 176. Cf. James Surowiecki, System Overload, NEW YORKER (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www. 
newyorker.com/magazine/2016/04/18/inside-americas-infrastructure-problem [https://perma.cc/ 
4B59-26LH] (suggesting that the large-scale repairs needed in Washington D.C.’s public 
transportation system could spur a nationwide effort to invest in infrastructure).  
